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Abstract
Starr-McCluer (1996) documented an empirical finding that the US households
covered by health insurance saved more than those without coverage, which is
inconsistent with the standard consumption-saving theory. This study provides a
structural analysis and suggests that institutional factors, in particular, a social in-
surance (safety net) system and an employment-based health insurance system, can
account for this puzzling finding. A dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model
is built that incorporates these two institutions with heterogeneous agents making
decisions regarding saving, labor supply and health insurance endogenously when
they are young. The model, in which agents save in a precautionary manner, can
generate Starr-McCluer’s empirical finding and it indicates that the empirical find-
ing is not inconsistent with the standard theory of saving under uncertainty. Coun-
terfactual experiments are performed to provide implications for empirical analyses
and illustrate the danger of empirical work without a sound theoretical background.
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1 Introduction
Starr-McCluer (1996) argued that the standard consumption-saving theory, which im-
plies that more insured households should save less for precautionary motives, is in-
consistent with their empirical finding that US households covered by private health
insurance save more than comparable uninsured households. To examine this issue, I
build a structural model, in which the majority of health insurance is privately provided
through employment and the government operates a social insurance system that covers
medical expenditures when they become so significant as to reduce household wealth
below a pre-specified threshold. The model, in which households save in a precaution-
ary manner, can generate Starr-McCluer’s (1996) empirical finding for two reasons: 1)
the social insurance system creates a strong disincentive to save (as discussed in Hub-
bard et al., 1995) and to purchase health insurance. However, the availability of health
insurance (e.g., insurance offers from employers) reduces the likelihood of accessing
the social insurance, and so has a positive effect on saving; 2) the health insurance sta-
tus is uncertain (highly contingent on employment) and mean-reverting, and therefore
households currently covered by health insurance are in a good state and will save for a
precautionary motive against the positive probability that they will move to the bad state
and lose the insurance coverage that reinforces the positive insurance-saving correlation.
This paper suggests that Starr-McCluer’s finding is not at odds with the standard theory
of saving under uncertainty, and that the above two institutional factors can account for
the insurance-savings correlation. Counterfactual experiments are performed to provide
implications for empirical analyses and illustrate the danger of empirical work without
a sound theoretical background.1
To provide a structural analysis, I build a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model, where heterogeneous agents face uncertain retirement/death, idiosyncratic in-
come and medical shocks, and make decisions regarding saving, labor supply and health
insurance endogenously. Markets are incomplete, and so risk-averse agents in the econ-
omy have an incentive to save in a precautionary manner and to purchase health in-
surance. Two institutions, a social insurance (safety net) system and an employment-
based health insurance system, are incorporated as key factors to examine the insurance-
savings correlation. Although the focus of this study is on the saving-insurance deci-
sions of the working-age population, Social security and Medicare are also incorporated
because they affect young agents’ expectation of their life after retirement.
1This model predicts that in an economy without either a large social insurance system or an
employment-based health insurance system, an empirical result contrary to Starr-McCluer’s finding would
be found.
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The goal of this study is to diagnose the empirical puzzle with a structural approach
and provide implications for studies on related saving/insurance issues. This study con-
tributes to the literature pioneered by Kotlikoff (1989) analyzing the effects of health
expenditure shocks on precautionary savings, and the literature of dynamic equilibrium
models with heterogeneous agents in incomplete markets.2 Several recent studies have
examined the impacts of health and medical expenditures in Aiyagari-Bewley type mod-
els.3 However, there are relatively few studies that have applied this approach to the
study of health insurance programs. Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2008) and Jeske and
Kitao (2009) are two exceptions.
The theoretical framework in this study is similar to that in Jeske and Kitao (2009),
who analyze the effects of the US tax policy on health insurance choices, and different
from previous studies by endogenizing the health insurance decision, rather than treating
households’ out-of-pocket health expenditures as an exogenous shock. The main differ-
ences between the model in this study and that of Jeske and Kitao are the following:
1) the labor decision is endogenous in this study, and therefore in addition to savings,
agents can adjust labor supply as well for consumption smoothing; 2) the timing of pur-
chasing health insurance is made consistent with the timing of receiving Medicare – A
young agent makes a decision of accepting an offer of employer-sponsored health insur-
ance (EHI) if available, purchasing private individual health insurance (IHI), or being
uninsured at the beginning of each period rather than at the end of each period.4 The
medical shock is realized after the insurance decision is made, and then agents make
other economic decisions (e.g., consumption and saving). In addition to the consistency
issue, because retirement is stochastic and realized at the beginning of each period in
such models, this setting prevents forcing agents to carry EHI or IHI purchased in the
last period to the first period of the retirement stage and forego the Medicare benefit,
which provides universal coverage with a highly subsidized premium to retired agents.5
Attanasio, Kitao and Violante (2008) use a general equilibrium life cycle model
with incomplete markets, endogenous labor decisions and medical expenditure shocks
2Bewley (1986), Imrohoroglu (1989), Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994) pioneered the literature.
3For example, Livshits et al.(2007) and Chatterjee et al.(2007) suggested that medical expenditure shock
is an important reason for consumer bankruptcy. Palumbo (1999), De Nardi et al.(2006) and Scholz et
al.(2006) studied medical expenses for understanding the pattern of retirement savings.
4The timing of making a health insurance decision set at the end of each period in Jeske and Kitao
(2009), and the insurance purchased this period will cover the medical expenditures in the next period.
However, once an agent retires (i.e. hit by a retirement shock in the model), the agent will qualify for
Medicare immediately that covers the current medical expenditures.
5However, this setting of consistent timing of insurance coverage results in a more complicated decision
process within a time period.
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to evaluate alternative financing schemes for Medicare. The health insurance coverage
for young agents is not endogenized because they focus on Medicare, which serves the
elderly.6
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the puzzling
empirical finding. Section 3 introduces the model. Section 4 presents specifications of
the model and calibration. The quantitative analysis and discussion are provided in
Section 5. Section 6 presents the conclusion.
2 The Puzzling Finding of Health Insurance Coverage and
Household Asset Holdings
Starr-McCluer (1996) studies the impact of private health insurance on household sav-
ings in the US working-age population and tests the precautionary saving hypothe-
sis. Although Starr-McCluer applies several econometric methods to control for other
household characteristics and factors that also affect saving, the results indicate that
health insurance coverage has a significant and positive effect on savings. Table 1
presents part of the empirical results of her study. We can see that the coefficients
of health insurance coverage (labeled “HI coverage”) are significant and positive in all
the three regressions regardless of the measure of assets.
Guariglia and Rossi (2004) also studied the effects of private medical insurance on
household savings, employing the British Household Panel Survey data. Their findings
are similar to those of Starr-McCluer: health insurance coverage increases the prob-
ability of saving. On the basis of these empirical findings, they suggest that British
households do not have precautionary savings for health risk, and that selectivity does
not explain these puzzling empirical results. Although Guariglia and Rossi (2004) have
results similar to Starr-McCluer’s, the UK health insurance environment differs signif-
icantly from that in the US. The National Health Service (NHS) is the dominant health
care provider in the UK, with universal provision that is generally free at source, with
private insurance being supplementary to the NHS. In the US, private health insurance
is dominant and many Americans are uninsured. This study focuses on the US environ-
ment and Starr-McCluer’s empirical finding. The analysis provided in this study might
not be directly applicable to the case of UK.7
6The focus of this paper is on the working-age population, similar to Jeske and Kitao (2009), and a life-
cycle analysis is not performed. A general equilibrium life cycle model similar to that in Attanasio, Kitao
and Violante (2008) with endogenous health insurance decision is used in Hansen, Hsu and Lee (2011), to
evaluate alternative health insurance reform options.
7Hsu, Liao and Lin (2011) use a model similar to this study and discuss the impact of supplemental
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Table 1: Empirical finding: Regressions with various measures of assets.
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3
Variables (X/Y ) (Liquid assets) ( Financial assets) (Net worth)
HI coverage 2.66* 2.97* 1.72*
Permanent Income 1.53* 1.71* 1.69*
Health problems -0.34* -0.28* -0.41*
Source: Starr-McCluer (1996), page 290. Only selected variables are reported here.
* indicate significance at the 5% level.
3 The Model
This section describes the model settings for the benchmark economy.
3.1 General model environment
3.1.1 Demographics
The economy is populated by a continuum of agents (measure one), who maximize
expected discounted lifetime utility from consumption and leisure. The population con-
sists of two generations – the young and the old. Young agents supply labor and earn
wage income, while the old agents are retired from work and receive social security
benefits. Young agents retire with a probability ρo every period, and old retired agents
die and leave the economy with a probability ρd every period. At the beginning of each
period, the economy has new-born young agents replacing those old agents, who died at
the end of previous period, such that the measure of total population stays constant. The
demographic setting with the probabilities described above implies that the proportion
of old agents in the population is ρoρo+ρd , and that of young agents is
ρd
ρo+ρd
. I do not
consider the annuity market for the old in this economy and assume all bequests are
accidental and distributed equally to all the surviving households.
3.1.2 Idiosyncratic Shocks
Labor productivity shock
Young agents’ effective labor supply depends on the hours worked and a stochastic
private health insurance on household savings in an environment, in which universal health insurance is
publicly provided. Empirical evidence to confirm the model prediction is provided as well.
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idiosyncratic labor productivity shock z. In each period t, the idiosyncratic labor pro-
ductivity shock takes a value in a finite set Z = {z1,z2, ...,zn}. Each agent’s productivity
shock evolves independently according to a first-order Markov process with a transition
probability matrix P(z′|z) and an invariant distribution p¯iz. Old agents retire from the labor
market and therefore do not encounter any labor shock (assuming their z fixed at 0).
Medical expenditure shock
Both young and old agents face medical expenditure shocks x. In each period t, each
agent’s medical expenditure shock takes a value in a finite set Xi = {x1,i,x2,i, ...,xm,i}
for i ∈ {old,young}. Each household’s medical expenditure shock also evolves inde-
pendently according to a first-order Markov process with a transition probability matrix
Pi(x′|x) for i ∈ {old,young} and an invariant distribution p¯ix,i for i ∈ {old,young}.
3.1.3 Production Technology
On the production side, we assume that there is a continuum of competitive firms oper-
ating a technology with constant returns to scale. Aggregate output Y is given by
Y = F (K,L) = AKθL1−θ ,
whereK and L are the aggregate capital and effective labor employed by the firm’s sector
and A is the total factor productivity. Capital depreciates at the rate of δ every period. θ
denotes the capital income share.
3.1.4 Preference
I adopt a standard utility function u(c,n), which is consistent with a balanced growth
path and is widely used in the growth literature, as shown below:
u(c,n) =
[
cφ (1−n)1−φ ]1−µ
1−µ , (1)
where µ is the relative risk aversion coefficient.
3.1.5 Asset Market
Individuals can hold assets, and therefore they can partially insure themselves against
income/expenditure uncertainties by accumulating precautionary asset holdings. While
they are allowed to insure themselves by accumulating positive asset holdings, borrow-
ing is limited to reflect the market incompleteness in the real world.
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3.2 Government and Social Programs
Government’s revenue consists of revenues from different tax instruments, labor income
tax τn, capital income tax τk, consumption tax τc, and social security tax τss. The social
security tax τss is imposed on young agents’ labor income.
The government runs three social programs: social security, Medicare, and means-
tested social insurance (safety net).
Social Security
The social security program provides the old (retired) agents with a benefit ss. . As
shown below, it is self-financed by the social security tax revenue:∫
(ss)dΦ(s) =
∫
τss(wzn)dΦ(s), (2)
where Φ(s) is the distribution of population over the state space s.
Medicare
Medicare is a public program through which the government provides health insurance
for the elderly. Once agents reach the old age in the model, they are automatically
covered by Medicare. Medicare covers a fraction ωo(x) of realized medical expenditure
x, and it is financed by a combination of general government budget and a Medicare
premium qmed from each benefit recipient.
Social insurance
The asset-based, means-tested social insurance system enables households to maintain a
minimum consumption level (denoted by c) that the government would like to guarantee.
I employ a simple rule for the operation of the social insurance system similar to that
used by Hubbard et al. (1995): if a household’s disposable income and assets H (net
after medical expenditure) are lower than c, the household qualifies for and will receive
social-insurance benefits (a transfer payment) to the extent that households can have at
least c cash on hand to spend.8
Social insurance payments, Medicare, repayment of government debt D, and other
government expenditures are financed by the revenue earned from labor income tax (τn),
8This simple social insurance system is used to characterize the social programs with means tests and
asset restrictions in the US, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI), and food stamps.
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capital income tax τk, consumption tax τc, Medicare premiums qmed , and new debt D′.
G+
∫
[TR+ωo(x)x]dΦ(s)+(1+ r)D=
∫
[τn(wzn)+ τkr(a+b)+ τcc+qmed ]dΦ(s)+D′,
(3)
where TR is the amount of financial transfer from the social insurance system, x is
individual medical expenditure, a denotes the individual asset holdings, b represents
accidental bequests, G represents all other government expenditures, and Φ(s) is the
distribution of population over the state space.
3.3 Private Health Insurance
To characterize the current US health insurance market, two types of private health insur-
ance (PHI) are incorporated in the model – employment-based health insurance (EHI)
and individual health insurance (IHI). The former, which is offered by employers and
required by law not to discriminate on the basis of health, is also called a group health
insurance. In the latter, insurance companies have an incentive to price-discriminate.
Everyone has access to IHI, but EHI is available only if it is offered by the employer.
I use e to denote the EHI offer status. EHI’s premium, qe, does not depend on individual
statuses. If EHI is offered (e= 1), the premium cost is partially shared by the employer
(with a share εe) but an amount (εeqe) will be deducted from employees’ wages to en-
sure the firm’s break-even condition. If an agent decides to accept the EHI offer at the
beginning of a period, a fraction ωe(x′) of the realized medical cost x′ in this period will
be covered by the EHI.
If an agent is not offered an EHI (e = 0) or declines the EHI offer, she/he can still
purchase an IHI contract to cover medical shocks. A premium qp (x), which depends
on the agent’s initial health status (i.e. last medical expenditure) x, must be paid at the
beginning of the period before the medical shock of this period (x′) is realized . The
status-dependent insurance premium reflects the actual price discrimination in the IHI
market.
Health insurance companies are assumed to be risk-neutral and competitive. They
are able to monitor each agent’s state of health expenditure. It is assumed that there is
no cross-subsidy across contracts. The premium for an insurance contract offered to an
individual whose previous medical expenditure was x satisfies the following condition:
qp (x) = (1+ψ)E
[
ωp(x′) · x′|x
]
, (4)
where ωp(x) ∈ [0,1] denotes a proportion of total medical expenditure (x) covered by
the insurance, and ψ denotes a proportional mark-up.
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Figure 1: Time line of shock realization and decision making
3.4 Agent’s Problem
3.4.1 The Time Line of Decisions
Each model period contains two stages of shock realization and decision making. At
the beginning of each period (stage 1), agents observe the asset holdings from the last
period a, the labor productivity z, EHI offer e, last period medical expenditure x, and
decide whether to take up the EHI (if e= 1) or to purchase a private insurance contract
IHI before this period’s medical shock x′ is realized. iHI is an indicator that denotes the
insurance decision. After the insurance decision is made (stage 2), medical expenditure
shock x′ is realized, and then households make decisions on consumption c, labor supply
n, and asset holdings a′. Figure 1 illustrates the process of shock realization and decision
making at time t in the model.
3.4.2 Young Agent’s Problem
The state can be summarized by a vector s = (a,z,e,x) when a young agent makes the
insurance decision. Then, additional information on x′ is available for forming expecta-
tions and other economic decisions. A young agent’s problem can be expressed as:
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V (s) =max
iHI
{
∑
x′
Py(x′|x) maxc,n,a′
{
u(c,n)+β
{
(1−ρo)E
[
V
(
s′
)∣∣s,x′]+ρoE [Vo (s′)∣∣s,x′]}}}
(5)
subject to
(1+ τc)c+a′+ qˆ=Wely+TR (6)
Wely ≡ (1− τss− τn) LˆI+[1+(1− τk)r] (a+b)− [1− ωˆ]x′ (7)
LˆI =
{
wzn if e= 0
wzn− εeqe if e= 1
(8)
qˆ=

0 if iHI = 0
(1− εe)qe if e= 1 and iHI = 1
qp(x) if iHI = 2
(9)
ωˆ =

0 if iHI = 0
ωe(x′) if e= 1 and iHI = 1
ωp(x′) if iHI = 2
(10)
TR=max{0, (1+ τc)c−Wely} (11)
iHI ∈ {0,1,2}; a′ ≥ 0; 0≥ n< 1; (12)
whereVo is the value when the agent becomes old; LˆI denotes the labor income; εe is the
employer’s share of EHI premium; TR is the transfer from the social insurance system;
iHI is an indicator that takes a value of 1 if the agent accepts the EHI offer (if e = 1), a
value of 2 if the agent purchases private individual health insurance, and 0 otherwise.9
3.4.3 Old Agent’s Problem
For the retired, their labor productivity z and EHI offer e are both fixed at 0. They supply
no labor and receive social security payment ss as their main income source. Therefore,
they encounter the medical shock without income uncertainty. All retired agents are
assumed to be automatically enrolled in Medicare. With the Medicare coverage, the
out-of-pocket medical expenditure is [1−ωo(x)]x out of the realized total medical cost
x.
9The utility function given in equation (1) implies that labor supply can be expressed as a function of
consumption and effective wage rate:
n= 1− (1−φ)(1+ τc)c
φ(1− τn− τss)wz . (13)
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An old agent’s problem is given as
Vo (s) =∑
x′
Po(x′|x) maxc,a′
{
u(c,1)+β (1−ρd)E
[
Vo(s′)|s,x′
]}
(14)
subject to
(1+ τc)c+a′ =Welo+TR (15)
Welo ≡ ss+[1+(1− τk)r] (a+b)−
[
1−ωo(x′)
]
x′−qmed (16)
TR=max{0, (1+ τc)c−Welo} (17)
a′ ≥ 0. (18)
3.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A stationary recursive competitive equilibrium consists of individual decision rules of
asset holding a′, labor supply n, health insurance take-up iHI and consumption c, as
well as a set of firm decisions regarding capital rented K and effective labor employed
L, a price system of w and r, EHI’s expenditure coverage ratio ωo, premium qe and
employer’s share εe, private IHI expenditure coverage ratio ωp and premium qp, a gov-
ernment policy of tax rates {τn, τk, τc}, government expenditure G, a Medicare policy
{ωo, qmed}, a social insurance policy (c), a social security policy {ss, τss}, a lump-sum
transfer of accidental bequests b, and a stationary distribution of population over the
state space Φ(s), such that:
a) given the price system, EHI premium and employer’s share, the decision rules of K
and L solve the firm’s profit maximization problem;
b) given the price system, health insurance plans, accidental bequests and the gov-
ernment policies, the decision rules of {iHI,a′,n,c} solve young and old agents’
problems;
c) insurance companies are competitive. The IHI premium satisfies condition (4), and
the EHI premium satisfies:
qe =
∫
E[ωe(x′)x′|x](iHIe)Φ(s)ds∫
(iHIe)Φ(s)ds
. (19)
d) the government policies satisfy the government’s budget constraints (2) and (3);
e) all markets clear: L=
∫
(zn)Φ(s)ds and K+D=
∫
(a+b)Φ(s)ds;
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f) the resource feasibility condition is satisfied:
Y +K =C+X+G+K′−δK,
where C is the aggregate consumption C =
∫
(c)Φ(s)ds, and X is the aggregate
medical expenditure X =
∫
(x)Φ(s)ds.
4 Model Specification and Calibration
To solve the model numerically and provide an adequate quantitative analysis, I begin
by describing the calibration and parameterization of the model. The benchmark model
is used to characterize the US economy. A summary of parameters is presented in Table
6.
4.1 Demographics
The model period is one year. The economy is populated by a continuum of agents
(measure one) and they maximize expected discounted lifetime utility from consump-
tion and leisure. The population consists of two generations – the young and the old.
Young agents represent those aged between 20 and 64, and old agents include those
aged 65 and above. Young agents retire with a probability ρo, and therefore, on average,
the young agents work for (1/ρo) years. The aging/retirement probability ρo is set at
1/45 so that the young on average stay in the labor force for 45 years. After retiring
from the labor market, the old die and leave the economy with a death probability of
ρd . The death probability ρd is set in a manner that old agents constitute 20% of the
population according to the data of the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) as
shown in Jeske and Kitao (2009). In each period, the economy has new young agents
entering to balance the old agent deaths for a constant total population.
4.2 Social Insurance
To characterize the means-tested social insurance system, it is necessary to measure
the consumption floor (c) that the government attempts to guarantee, above and beyond
medical expenses, through means-tested transfer payments. Hubbard et al. (1995) make
the first approximation by calculating the consumption floor for a representative US
family. Their estimate includes only asset- and means-tested transfer payments, such as
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), food stamps, and Section 8 housing
assistance for those under age 65. Unemployment insurance is not included because it is
not means-tested, and it is already included in the measure of income. Medicaid (for the
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poor) is part of the means-tested social insurance system, but it should not be included
in c because it is exclusively used to pay for medical expenses.10
Their estimation suggests that, for a female-headed family with two dependent chil-
dren and no outside earnings or assets, the median AFDC and food stamp transfers
($5,764) plus expected housing subsidies ($1,173) were $6,937 in 1984. In terms of per
person subsidy (6,937/3), it constituted approximately 14% of GDP per capita in 1984
(which is $16,549). As mentioned by Hubbard et al., the total benefit may change sig-
nificantly with a different household condition (e.g. if there is a father in the household).
Therefore, c is chosen to be 15% of GDP per capita in the benchmark model ($5,729 in
2003), and alternative values from 1% to 35% will also be evaluated.
4.3 Preferences and Production Technology
The risk aversion parameter µ is set at 3, which is widely used in the literature and
consistent with the range found in empirical studies. Alternative values of µ will be
examined to check the robustness of the results. The utility discount factor (β ) is chosen
so that the capital-output ratio equals 3. The leisure utility parameter φ is chosen so that
aggregate labor hours equal 0.33 in the benchmark economy.
In the production function, the capital income share (θ ) is set at 0.33, and the de-
preciation rate of capital (δ ) is set at 0.06. Total factor productivity A is normalized to
unity. The above parameter values are chosen to be consistent with aggregate features
of the postwar U.S. economy and are commonly used in aggregative models of growth
and business cycles.
4.4 Labor Productivity and EHI Offer Uncertainties
In the model, the labor productivity shock (z) process is used to capture income fluctua-
tions. Because EHI offer, e ∈ {0,1}, is highly contingent on income status, the income
process should be estimated jointly with the EHI offer process. Jeske and Kitao (2009)
studied the joint process of wage income and EHI offer based on the MEPS data. Based
on their report, five states of z, (0.095,0.484,0.815,1.238,2.374), are used to approxi-
mate the labor income distribution of the economy and represent five equal-sized income
10In the model, medical payments are included in the transfer payments, TR, made by the social insurance
system. However, by definition, the medical payments should not be included in c. TR has two components,
and can be expressed as follows: TR= c−H = {c−(1−τss−τn)LˆI− [1+(1−τk)r](a+b)}+X , financial
support for minimum consumption standard and support for medical care.
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groups. The corresponding joint transition probabilities of (z,e) are as follows:
Pr(z′,e′)|(z,e) =

0.201 0.313 0.110 0.065 0.046 0.165 0.074 0.019 0.005 0.002
0.068 0.436 0.251 0.079 0.018 0.051 0.065 0.022 0.008 0.002
0.024 0.122 0.489 0.240 0.052 0.015 0.019 0.024 0.013 0.002
0.012 0.060 0.152 0.527 0.187 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.022 0.011
0.009 0.025 0.048 0.135 0.724 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.030
0.042 0.045 0.013 0.007 0.003 0.715 0.124 0.033 0.013 0.005
0.025 0.119 0.038 0.022 0.004 0.219 0.372 0.136 0.040 0.025
0.010 0.044 0.098 0.035 0.014 0.140 0.202 0.285 0.126 0.046
0.008 0.018 0.034 0.075 0.029 0.099 0.138 0.158 0.305 0.136
0.010 0.017 0.008 0.013 0.070 0.088 0.100 0.094 0.170 0.430

,
where the first five rows from the top are the transition probabilities for current e = 0
with each z, and the second five rows are those for e= 1.
4.5 Medical Expenditure Shocks
To characterize medical expenditure shocks, a Markov process is used directly instead
of an AR(1) process because of the skewness of medical expenditure. I define four
medical expenditure states as “low,” “ fair,” “high,” and “very high,” which represent
the medical expenditure of the bottom 60%, from 60 to 95%, from 95 to 99%, and the
top 1%, respectively. Jeske and Kitao (2009) have analyzed the distribution of medi-
cal expenditure and estimated the process of medical expenditure based on the MEPS.
According to their report, I calculate the mean of medical expenditure of each medical
expenditure group in the U.S. working-age and retired population in 2003. These ex-
penditures were 0.9%, 10.8%, 50.0%, and 159.4% of the average income in 2003 for
the four expenditure groups in the working-age population, respectively, and were 4.9%,
28.5%, 103.6%, and 226.5% of the average income in the retired population. Therefore,
I set the four-state medical expenditure shocks, Xy and Xo for the young and the old
respectively, as the above percentages of average labor income in the model (see Tables
2 and 3).
The MEPS ha provided two-year panels since 1996, which allows estimation of
transitions in medical expenditure states. Monheit (2003) uses the 1996/97 MEPS data
to study the persistence of medical expenditure. Jeske and Kitao (2009) also use the
MEPS data to determine the transition probabilities of medical expenditure states. In
this study, the transition probabilities for the Markov chain of medical expenditures are
calibrated based on the estimation from Jeske and Kitao (2009). The results are reported
in Tables 4 and 5.
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Table 2: State of medical expenditure – for the young (Xy)
Expenditure Average As of average
State range ($ in 2003) income (2003)
Low bottom 60% 310 0.9%
Fair 60 – 95% 3,597 10.8%
High 95 – 99% 16,629 50.0%
Very High top 1% 53,013 159.4%
Original source: MEPS.
Calculation based on Jeske and Kitao (2009).
Table 3: State of medical expenditure – for the old (Xo)
Expenditure Average As of average
State range ($ in 2003) income (2003)
Low bottom 60% 1,630 4.9%
Fair 60 – 95% 9,474 28.5%
High 95 – 99% 34,455 103.6%
Very High top 1% 75,329 226.5%
Original source: MEPS.
Calculation based on Jeske and Kitao (2009).
4.6 Health Insurance
Based on the MEPS, private health insurance provides various expenditure coverage
rates depending on the age and amount of medical expenditure. I use the report provided
in Jeske and Kitao (2009) to set the expenditure coverage rates of PHI ( both IHI’s
ωp(x) and EHI’s ωe(x)) as (.528 .702 .765 .845) for the young agent’s four medical
expenditure states, respectively, and set Medicare’s ωo(x) as (.315 .511 .637 .768) for
old agents’ four medical expenditure states. Every old agent is assumed to be enrolled
in Medicare. According to the report, “Medicare: A Primer 2010,” from the Kaiser
Family Foundation, Medicare premiums contributes only 12% of the total Medicare
expenditure. The ratio of total the Medicare cost is used for setting the premium qmed in
the model.
The PHI serves as the primary insurance in the benchmark economy. The markup ψ
of PHI in the benchmark economy is chosen so that there are 75% of non-elderly agents
taking up PHI (including EHI and IHI), which is set to match the PHI coverage among
the 21-64 age group according to the 2003 MEPS. According to the 1996-2008 MEPS
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Table 4: Transition probabilities of Xy
Low Fair High Very High
Low 0.784 0.199 0.014 0.003
Fair 0.337 0.591 0.062 0.009
High 0.173 0.562 0.200 0.065
Very High 0.105 0.376 0.286 0.233
Original source: MEPS.
Calculation based on Jeske and Kitao (2009).
Table 5: Transition probabilities of Xo
Low Fair High Very High
Low 0.762 0.217 0.019 0.003
Fair 0.368 0.551 0.062 0.018
High 0.218 0.591 0.137 0.054
Very High 0.118 0.608 0.264 0.010
Original source: MEPS.
Calculation based on Jeske and Kitao (2009).
data the PHI take up ratio shows a slightly declining trend over time. The ratio was 77%
in 1996, 75% in 2003 - 04, and fell to 73% in 2008. I choose the 2003 ratio to calibrate
ψ so that the year is consistent with the medical shock and EHI offer processes, which
are set based on the report in Jeske and Kitao (2009).
4.7 Social Security and Government Taxation
The social security payment is set as 45% of average labor income according to the
study by Whitehouse (2003). Based on I˙mrohorog˘lu and Kitao (2009 and 2010), the
consumption tax rate is set at 5%, the capital income tax is 30%, the total labor income
tax rate is 35% (including Social Security tax and Medicare tax) and the government
debt to output ratio is set at40%.
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Table 6: Summary of parameters for the benchmark economy
Parameter Description Values Target/Note
Preferences
β discount factor 0.962 capital-output ratio = 3
µ relative risk aversion 3
φ utility parameter 0.400 average labor hours = 0.33
Technology and production
θ capital income share 0.33
δ depreciation rate of capital 0.06
Demographics
ρo probability of aging/retiring 0.222 average years of working = 45
ρd probability of death after retire-
ment
0.889 share of old population = 0.2
Government
τc consumption tax rate 0.05
τn+ τss total labor tax 0.35
τk capital tax 0.30
ss Social Security payment 45% of average earnings
c social insurance consumption
floor
15% of GDP per capita
D government debt 40% of GDP
Health insurance
qmed Medicare premium 12% of average Medicare cost
ψ PHI premium markup 0.035 PHI take up ratio = 0.75
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5 Quantitative Analysis
The model is solved for its steady-state equilibrium, and simulations are performed for
quantitative analysis. This section first describes the equilibrium features in the bench-
mark economy and demonstrates that Starr-McCluer’s empirical finding is generated by
the model.11
This model, which has risk-averse agents, as in a standard consumption-saving
model, with taking into account institutional factors, suggest that social insurance and
EHI can account for the positive insurance-saving correlation. Counterfactual experi-
ments are also performed to understand the roles of the two institutions better. Implica-
tions for empirical tests are discussed as well.
5.1 Is a Positive Insurance-Saving Correlation Puzzling?
5.1.1 Features of the Benchmark Economy
The benchmark economy represents the US economy, particularly the features of the
health insurance market. Given that the model is calibrated to match the capital-output
ratio, average labor supply, and the PHI take-up ratio among the young agents, the frac-
tion of total population covered by health insurance (including EHI, IHI, and Medicare)
is 80% (first panel of Table 7). In addition, the second panel of Table 7 further shows as-
set holdings according to health insurance type for insured agents compared with those
of uninsured agents (whose asset holdings are normalized to one). Those covered by
EHI, on average, hold 61% more assets than the uninsured, and those covered by PHI
hold 22% more. Consequently, the unconditional means have shown that young agents,
who have insurance coverage (either EHI or IHI), save more than those without insur-
ance coverage. All old agents are covered by Medicare and their asset holdings are less
than those of the uninsured (young) agents (see amed/aun in Table 7), because old agents
are retired and no longer encounter any income uncertainty. However, old agents, face
a probability of leaving the economy (death), and therefore – they dissave.
Table 8 presents insurance coverage and take-up ratios. The majority of PHI is
employment-based, which is a feature of the US health insurance market. If EHI is
offered, most agents (96%) will accept it (see the 4th column of Table 8) since the
premium of EHI is highly subsidized by employers. The take-up ratio of EHI offers is
11Given the equilibrium prices, the solved individual decision rules and shock processes are adopted to
simulate an individual’s period choices for 200,000 rounds. The first 15,000 observations are discarded to
prevent the bias caused by the initial condition, and the remaining observations are used to approximate the
cross-sectional distribution in the economy.
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Table 7: Benchmark: Aggregate features
Capital-output Interest Aggregate Total insured
ratio rate labor hours ratio
3 4.87% 0.33 0.80
Asset holdings by insurance status
aEHI/aun aIHI/aun aPHI/aun amed/aun
1.61 1.22 1.54 0.70
Notes: ai/aun is the ratio of average asset holdings of agents
covered by type i health insurance to that of the uninsured.
PHI includes EHI and IHI. µ = 3 and c= .15y¯.
slightly lower than that (99%) in Jeske and Kitao (2009). Because agents are considered
to adjust their labor supply as an additional tool to smoothen consumption, they can rely
less on health insurance. This result is consistent with the report in Fronstin (2007) that
states, from 1995 to 2005, if EHI from a spouse’s employers and former employers are
included, the take up ratio is about 95%.12 In contrast, only 37% of those without an
EHI offer purchase a private IHI plan, so that the proportion of individuals with PHI
coverage is 75% in the working-age population.
In addition, PHI coverage is generally increasing by income level, as presented in
the second panel of Table 8. This pattern is primarily driven by the greater probability
of receiving an EHI offer with a better job position (i.e., a higher labor productivity level
in the model). The PHI take up ratio in the top income group (93%) is slightly lower
than that in the second highest income group (95%), because the impact of the medical
shock on income is relatively less for the high-income agents that reduces the demand
for health insurance.
5.1.2 Empirical Testing
Although the statistics of mean asset holdings show that the insured save more than the
uninsured, to identify the effect of private health insurance on savings exclusively and to
test the precautionary saving hypothesis, empirical studies use econometric methods that
12Fronstin (2007) reported that among those workers eligible for EHI, between 84 percent to 86 percent
had coverage in their own name from their own employer. Approximately 10 percent were covered by a
different employer, which in most cases was a spouse’s employer, and in some cases was a former employer.
The remainder (generally less than 2 percent) either purchased insurance on their own or were covered by
a public program.
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Table 8: Benchmark: Health insurance coverage (working-age population)
Insurance PHI EHI insured/ IHI insured/ EHI take-up IHI take-up
type insured ratio total PHI total PHI (if offered) (w/o EHI )
Ratio 0.75 0.81 0.19 0.96 0.37
PHI coverage across income levels
Income Bottom 2nd 3rd 4th Top
level 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Coverage 0.40 0.60 0.86 0.95 0.93
Note: PHI includes both EHI and IHI.
control for other characteristics. I follow this approach with the model economy, and
therefore I am able to provide a comparison with the empirical finding in the literature.
I use the data generated from model simulation for regressions (with a sample size
of 185,000 observations for each regression). The regression model is set as follows:
ai,t = αPHIi,t +β ′Qi,t + εi,t , (20)
where ai,t is a young agent i’s asset holdings at time t, PHIi,t is a dummy variable of
private health insurance coverage, and Qi,t is a vector of variables, which control for all
other directly observable household characteristics that also affect saving.13 According
to the standard consumption-saving model, a negative coefficient of PHI (i.e. α < 0)
would be interpreted as verification of the existence of precautionary saving. In the
model economy, household characteristic vector Q simply contains two factors: labor
income (which is primarily determined by the labor productivity shock) and medical
expenditure.14
The regression result for the benchmark economy is reported on the first row of Ta-
ble 10. The coefficient of health insurance coverage (including EHI and IHI) is also
significant positive and consistent with Starr-McCluer’s (1996) finding. However, the
interpretation of the result based on this model differs significantly from the conven-
tional interpretation in that a significant and positive coefficient of health insurance in
the above regression implies a rejection of the existence of precautionary saving. This
13See the control variables used in Starr-McCluer (1996), for examples.
14The unit for asset holdings, labor income, and medical expenditures is $1,000. Using this kind of
regression model as a basis, Starr-McCluer (1996) estimated the above asset holding equation (20) by
controlling for the estimated permanent income, health problems, and other household characteristics as
independent variables in Qi,t , and reported a significant positive coefficient of PHI using US cross-section
data for the working-age population.
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interpretation is not always correct. As shown in the above exercise, in the model econ-
omy, the regression model is unable to actually reveal the existence of precautionary
saving in an economy with a social insurance system and an employment-based health
insurance system.
5.1.3 The Mechanism
The reason for the invalidity of the empirical test is that the regression model can only
capture the net saving effect of health insurance, rather than the exclusive effect on
precautionary saving.
This model suggests two institutional factors, the social insurance and the EHI sys-
tems, can account for the positive saving effect of PHI.
As discussed in Hubbard et al. (1995), the social insurance system creates a strong
disincentive to save because it reduces the risk as well as the need for precautionary
savings, particularly among those low-income agents. For the same reason, social in-
surance also substitutes the service provided by PHI, and therefore creates a positive
correlation of PHI take-ups and savings by reducing both. In addition, the availability
of health insurance coverage (e.g., EHI from employers) moderates the fluctuation of
disposable resources caused by medical expenditure shocks and therefore reduces the
likelihood of accessing the social insurance that increases the expected return of asset
holdings and leads to a positive effect on savings.
The nature of EHI also creates a positive correlation between insurance coverage and
savings. Because the EHI offer is uncertain (highly contingent on employment/income
status) and mean-reverting, agents currently covered by health insurance are in a good
state and therefore will save for a precautionary motive to smooth their consumption in
case they move to the bad state without EHI.
In what follows, I first demonstrate that the result is robust with alternative risk aver-
sion settings, and then I further diagnose the failure of the standard regression model by
performing counter-factual experiments. Implications of this model for the assessment
of the empirical approaches to testing the precautionary saving hypothesis will be also
discussed.
5.1.4 Robustness Check
Economies with alternative risk aversion are evaluated. In particular, a less risk-averse
case with µ = 2 and a more risk-averse case with µ = 4 are investigated. The same
empirical exercise is applied to each economy. Table 9 shows the aggregate features of
the two alternative economies. As expected, with all other parameters fixed, a lower µ
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Table 9: Robustness check: Aggregate features
Economy with µ = 2
Capital-output Interest Aggregate Total insured
ratio rate labor hours ratio aPHI/aun
2.92 5.30% 0.32 0.71 1.62
Economy with µ = 4
Capital-output Interest Aggregate Total insured
ratio rate labor hours ratio aPHI/aun
3.19 4.35% 0.33 0.84 1.65
Notes: aPHI/aun is the ratio of average asset holdings of agents covered
by PHI to that of the uninsured. PHI includes both EHI and IHI.
leads to less precautionary savings and therefore a lower capital-output ratio as well as
higher interest rate; the total health insurance take up ratio is also lower. in contrast, a
higher µ leads to a higher capital-output ratio, a lower interest rate and a higher health
insurance take up ratio. In Table 10 the second row presents the regression result of the
economy with µ = 2, and the third row presents the result of the economy with µ = 4.
The coefficients of the health insurance coverage are significant and positive in both
cases with alternative risk aversion.
5.2 Implications for Empirical Testing – Roles of the Institutions
It is natural to ask in what condition a regression model like the above is appropriate
for testing precautionary saving. Counterfactual experiments are performed in this sub-
section to examine the roles of each institutional factor that can affect insurance-saving
pattern. First I investigate an economy with minimal social insurance and an economy
without EHI. Various degrees of social insurance in economies with and without EHI are
further studied to thoroughly examine the appropriateness of the empirical testing. An
income-tested social insurance (compared with the means-tested system in the bench-
mark) is also examined.
5.2.1 Counterfactual Experiment: Eliminating Social Insurance
With a positive probability, the medical expenditure shock will bring an agent’s net
wealth to a negative value that leads to negative consumption under the borrowing con-
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Table 10: Regression results: Robustness check
Explanatory HI Labor Medical
variable coverage income shock
The benchmark (µ = 3)
Coefficient 2.86 0.74 −0.34
Robustness check: µ = 2
Coefficient 3.72 0.67 −0.49
Robustness check: µ = 4
Coefficient 3.68 0.74 −0.28
Notes: (1) social insurance system: c= .15y¯.
(2) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
straint in the model; there must be some social assistance to prevent this negative con-
sumption situation. For a counterfactual experiment, instead of eliminating the entire
social insurance system, which would cause a technical problem, I consider a minimal
social insurance system, setting the wealth floor c as 1% of average income. All other
parameters are kept the same as those in the benchmark.
The aggregate features are presented in Table 11. Without the original social insur-
ance, agents can barely rely on this social assistance when they experience a bad shock,
and therefore have a stronger incentive to save and to purchase health insurance. Conse-
quently, a higher capital-output ratio and a higher total insured ratio (which is driven by
a higher PHI take-up ratio) are observed. The unconditional mean of asset holdings of
agents covered by PHI is now higher than that of uninsured agents. This result greatly
deviates from the benchmark.
The same regression model is applied to control for other factors and the result is
shown in the second row of Table 12. In contrast to the benchmark, the regression in
this economy with minimal social insurance does show a significant negative coefficient
of PHI coverage, which supports the precautionary saving hypothesis.
5.2.2 The Size of Social Insurance Benefits
Health insurance has a positive saving effect by reducing the likelihood of accessing the
social insurance, although it also has a negative saving effect by substituting precaution-
ary savings. The net effect on saving , as captured by the above regression, is therefore
ambiguous.
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Table 11: Counterfactual experiments: Aggregate features
(1) Economy with minimal social insurance
Capital-output Interest Aggregate Total insured Asset holdings
ratio rate labor hours ratio aPHI/aun
3.53 3.36% 0.36 0.95 0.66
(2) Economy without EHI
Capital-output Interest Aggregate Total insured Asset holdings
ratio rate labor hours ratio aPHI/aun
2.96 5.16% 0.33 0.66 0.82
Notes: aPHI/aun is the ratio of average asset holdings of agents covered by PHI
to that of the uninsured. PHI includes both EHI and IHI. The social insurance c= .15y¯
in the benchmark and in case (2); c= .01y¯ in case (1).
I perform experiments with various sizes of social insurance benefits represented by
alternative settings of the wealth floor c, for further investigation. The same empirical
approach is applied to each economy, and the results are presented in Table 13. The
results indicate that when the social insurance is large, i.e., cases of c set at 15% average
income and above, the positive saving effect dominates and the (net) saving effect of
health insurance captured by the regression becomes positive.
5.2.3 Counterfactual Experiment: Eliminating EHI
An alternative experiment is eliminating the EHI system. Without the EHI offer, the total
insured ratio is lower than in the benchmark because agents have to purchase IHI with
no subsidy (see the second panel of Table 11). It is also observed that the unconditional
mean of asset holdings of agents covered by PHI is higher than that of uninsured agents.
The same regression model is applied and the result is shown in the third row of
Table 12. The regression result of this economy without EHI also presents a significant
negative coefficient of PHI coverage, which supports the precautionary saving hypothe-
sis.
Because the EHI offer is uncertain and contingent on employment status, an agent
receiving the EHI offer currently will have an incentive to save as a precautionary mea-
sure against the possibility of moving to a worse job position lacking EHI. This feature
reinforces the positive saving effect of health insurance. The counterfactual experiment
suggests that the positive net saving effect of PHI coverage is no longer maintained
when the EHI system is eliminated.
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Table 12: Regression results: Counterfactual experiments
Explanatory HI Labor Medical
variable coverage income shock
The benchmark
Coefficient 2.86 0.74 −0.34
Counterfactual (1): minimal social insurance
Coefficient −8.57 0.98 −0.37
Counterfactual (2): EHI unavailable
Coefficient −3.92 0.81 −0.70
Notes: Social insurance: c= .01y¯ in case (1);
c= .15y¯ in case (2). All coefficients are significant
at the 5% level.
Experiments with various sizes of social insurance benefits in economies without
EHI are also performed to provide a further investigation. The same empirical approach
is applied to each economy, and the results are presented in Table 14. In the case that
EHI is unavailable, only when the social assistance is large, e.g., c set at 25% and 30%
of average income in the last two columns of Table 14, a positive saving effect of PHI
coverage will be observed.
5.2.4 Alternative Social Insurance Scheme: Income-testing
In the benchmark and the analysis above, the scheme of social insurance is set up as that
in Hubbard et al. (1995), which is means-tested. In addition to the fact that the social
insurance reduces the need for precautionary savings, the means test also discourages
savings. To discover whether the means-testing scheme affects the result, I consider
an alternative, an income-tested social insurance system, in the model economy for
comparison. The transfer scheme, equation (12), in the benchmark model is changed to
an income-testing scheme as follows:
TR=max{0, (1+ τc)c− y˜}, (21)
where y˜ is the net income after tax and medical expenditure and is defined as
y˜= (1− τss− τn) LˆI+(1− τk)r(a+b)− (1− ωˆ)x′
for young agents, and
y˜= ss+(1− τk)r(a+b)−
[
1−ωo(x′)
]
x′−qmed
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Table 13: Regression results: Various sizes social insurance benefits
Size of social insurance system (c)
Variable c= .01y¯ .05y¯ .10y¯ .15y¯ .20y¯ .25y¯ .30y¯
(minimal) (bench) (large)
HI coverage −8.57 −3.28 −0.80 2.86 2.78 3.51 6.25
Labor income 0.98 0.98 0.93 0.74 0.68 0.61 0.36
Medical shock −0.37 −0.38 −0.35 −0.34 −0.41 −0.37 −0.31
Notes: (1) y¯ is average income.
(2) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
Table 14: Regression results: Economies without EHI
Size of social insurance system (c)
Variable c= .10y¯ .15y¯ .20y¯ .25y¯ .30y¯
HI coverage −11.86 −3.93 −0.89 0.21 0.43
Labor Income 0.79 0.81 0.68 0.61 0.56
Medical Shock −0.72 −0.70 −0.82 −0.87 −0.87
Notes: (1) y¯ is average income.
(2) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
for old agents. Asset holdings now are not considered for receiving the social insurance
benefits. Medical expenditures remain covered by social insurance to prevent consump-
tion from becoming negative. The income floor c remains set at 15% of average income,
and the regression result appears in the second panel of Table 15. The PHI coverage still
has a significant and positive effect on saving, which indicates that the substitution effect
of the social insurance on saving is more important than the means test. The alternative
income-testing scheme does not change the result from that in the benchmark.
6 Concluding Remarks
Considering a standard model of precautionary saving, a puzzling positive correlation
between private health insurance coverage and household asset holdings in the US has
been reported by Starr-McCluer (1996). This study suggested that the puzzling finding
can be explained by the existence of two institutions: a large social insurance (safety
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Table 15: Regression results – alternative social insurance scheme
Explanatory HI Labor Medical
variable coverage income shock
The benchmark
Coefficient 2.86 0.74 −0.34
Income-tested social insurance
Coefficient 3.81 0.54 −0.16
Notes: (1) social insurance system: c= .15y¯.
(2) All coefficients are significant at the 5% level.
net) system and an employment-based health insurance system. In order to analyze this
issue, I built a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model that incorporates these two
institutions with heterogeneous agents making decisions regarding saving, labor supply,
and health insurance endogenously. I showed that the model can generate the same
empirical finding as found in Starr-McCluer (1996). This result does not depend on the
assumptions of heterogeneity of risk aversion/preferences.
These findings call into question the appropriateness of the empirical approaches
directly based on the standard consumption-saving theory for testing the precaution-
ary saving hypothesis. Applying the empirical approach in the model economy, the
regression result is consistent with Starr-McCluer’s empirical finding, but the positive
coefficient of PHI coverage does not imply the nonexistence of precautionary saving. In
fact, households do have a motive to engage in precautionary saving in the model econ-
omy. The regression result must be interpreted carefully, because the regression model
captures the net saving effect of health insurance, rather than the effect on precaution-
ary savings exclusively. To appropriately test for the existence of precautionary saving
or investigate the substitution effect of insurance on precautionary savings, it is neces-
sary to control for the effects caused by these institutional factors. The counter-factual
experiments have demonstrated that if either the social insurance or the EHI system is
eliminated, the regression would generate a negative coefficient of PHI coverage that
supports the precautionary saving hypothesis. The analysis in this study indicates that
an economy with a low-level social assistance and without the feature of employment-
based insurance coverage would be a better environment for conducting an empirical
study regarding this issue. Nevertheless, in practice it is generally difficult to distin-
guish the effect on saving caused by the institutions from the effect of insurance on
precautionary saving. Further research is required to resolve this difficulty.
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